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THE BENIGN HISTORY OF A SCAM:
THE HMO EXPERIENCE
(As Seen by a Health Lawyer)
Joanne B. Stern

I. INTRODUCTION
When I began to practice health law in the early 1970s, Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) had been in existence for over thirty
years. Yet, there was little known about liMOs and few people had
actually enrolled in one. The concept seemed wonderful; by maintaining
ones health rather than dealing with dire consequences if one failed to do
so, both the HMO and the enrollee would reap enormous benefits. This
arrangement allowed the HMO to continue to survive and thrive (most
were non-profit entities), and the HIMO member would be able to prevent
health hazards before they occurred. Providers, for their part, would be
utilized to counsel and inform patients, to help avert crises, and to
intervene only when necessary to treat the ill.
Why were there so few lHMOs in existence until 19807 Most likely,
this was because ofthe medical establishments antipathy toward them and
because many state laws forbade the corporate practice of medicine, thus
precluding HMO development and licensure. In addition, most providers
(i.e., physicians and hospitals) were hostile, because they conceived of
liMOs as "a foot in the door of socialized medicine?' These providers
believed that working for an HMO would only diminish their income
capacities since HMO physicians were ordinarily compensated based on
capitation (i.e., a prepaid fee for each member) and, thus, could not
generally bill on a fee-for-service basis. Consequently, with both law
makers and providers opposed, the lobbying against lIMOs far

*Professor of Law, Whittier College School of Law, Los Angeles, CA; A.B., Brown University,
1967; D., Yale Law School, 1970. Over the past twenty-five years, Profesr Stem has -. rved
as a consultant to numerous health care organizations, consumer groups, educational institutions,
governmental agencies and Jaw finns on the development and regulation of -M0s,the California
Dep't of Corporations, the U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, and the California Dep't of
Health Services.
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outweighed, both in money and political influence, any lobbying in favor
of them.
II.

My involvement with HMOs goes back to 1971 when the federal
government saw the financial savings inherent in the HMO concept and
attempted to convert neighborhood health centers, which provided free
health care to the poor, into HMOs. A grant to develop model HMO
contracts was given to the National Health Law Program, a legal services
back-up center operating out of UCLA under the auspices ofthe Office of
Economic Opportunity. Fresh out of law school with one year's
experience at a large Los Angeles law firm, I was hired to research and
draft model HMO contracts and was eager to do so. Moreovr, under the
administration of Governor Reagan in California, Medi-Cal funds were
being siphoned to HMOs where it was thought that health care inflation
could be better controlled, and health care costs for the eligible poor
would be predictable and fixed.
From this vantage point I observed and studied the first large wave
of IMOs which developed in the late 1960's and early 1970's in
California. Most ofthese were sponsored by entrepreneurs; few providers
were enthusiastic and/or desirous ofparticipating. Though California law
required that all HMOs be non-profit entities, astute businessmen (with
the assistance of their-attorneys and consultants) realized that substantial
monies could be made by siphoning off a large percentage of the state
funding they received into newly formed private corporations, such as
management firms, real estate companies, pharmaceutical firms, and
marketing enterprises wholly, or partially, owned by the HMO developer.
As a result of such creative HIMO financing, scandal erupted.1
Dozens of EMOs were started on a shoestring budget and marketed
extensively, but for the most part provided minimal health care at best.
Most of the Medi-Cal funding which was directed toward recipient care
found its way to these private corporations, where hundreds of thousands
of dollars of prepaid monthly fees were spent not on the provision of
1See Andrea Schneider & Joanne Stem, Health Maintenance Organizationsand the Poor:
Problems andProspects,70 Mw U. L. REV. 90 (1975).
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health care, but on the provision of profits to these entrepreneurs. In some
cases, it was later found that only 15 percent of the health care monies
provided by the state was actually utilized for patient care. It was also
discovered that bribery and fraud had played a significant part in the
contracting process and that various state officials had dispensed such
contracts to parties who simultaneously agreed to utilize (and pay)
consulting firns in which they had a financial interest. Similarly,
employees were alleged to have sold "confidential" Medi-CaI lists for
exorbitant fees to favored contractors.
Few Medi-Cal HMOs survived this initial wave once the practices of
these so-called "pretzel factories" were exposed. The National Health
Law Program initiated class action law suits against various HIMOs and
the state, claiming deceptive marketing practices, shoddy and sometimes
even non-existent health care facilities. It was also discovered that since
marketers were paid a fixed sum for each enrollee they signed up,
numerous unethical and even fraudulent means were being employed to
sign up as many enrollees as possible. Many Medi-Cal recipients who
spoke no English were threatened, bribed, or thoroughly intimidated into
signing a form they could not decipher. In some cases, Medi-Cal
recipients were told by marketers, dressed up as nurses and physicians,
that they would lose all their Medi-Cal benefits if they did not sign. In
other cases, door-to-door marketers would offer free chicken dinners or
raffle tickets for their signatures. Even more enterprising, were several
prolific salesmen who claimed that the form they wanted signed was a
referendum to recall Governor Reagan, an "enemy" of the poor.
Since HMOs could only make money by enrolling as many Medi-Cal
beneficiaries as possible, their primary goal was to collect the monthly
prepaid fees from the state and then provide as little service as possible.
Consequently, once Medi-Cal enrollees were directed away from their
current physician, they found some of the new entities they had signed up
for were yet to be organized and/or built and that emergency numbers did
not answer. This deception left beneficiaries out in the cold.?
When federal and state hearings ensued to look into allegations raised
by subscribers, many of the HMOs folded. It was immediately clear that
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the provision ofpreventive care could easily lead to preclusion of services,
thus enabling the entrepreneur-developer to reap substantial financial
gains in a very short period. Various individuals who had been involved
with the fledgling HMOs testified at those hearings, while others invoked
their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. None, however,
were indicted. 'When Jerry Brown later became governor, most Medi-Cal
MVMOs were put out of business permanently. Knowledgeable health care
reformers predicted the so-called "California Experience" had set back the
acceptance of HMOs by at least a decade. These predictions, however,
were not to come true.

mI.
The major turning point in the national emergence of HMOs occurred
during the Nixon administration when the HMO Act of 19733 was passed.
The Act provided significant incentives for HMO development and
preempted many state laws that had precluded their existence. This was
largely accomplished through financial incentives (grants, loans and loan
subsidies) and a federal mandate requiring HMOs to be offered whenever
an employer of twenty-five or more employees also offered a traditional
health insurance plan to their employees. At a time when federal funds for
health care development were generally drying up, this was the most
significant legislation enacted to support and finance a new approach to
health care delivery. It was also thought that by emphasizing health
maintenance, HMOs could prevent health problems before they
developed, and, thus, efficiently manage health care inflation, which was
spiraling out of control.
With an eye toward potential abuses, the federal law was also written
to include various provisions relating to accessibility, availability and
quality of patient care. In addition, feasibility and planning grants were
widely available. Because it was recognized that the beneficent purpose
of the HIO could be totally undermined by a non-beneficent purpose of
the sponsor-developer, the law and regulations promulgated thereto called
for strict enforcement ofrules and federal oversight of HMO development

342 U.S.C.

§ 300 (1996).
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and qualification. A similar law, the Knox-Keene Health Care Service
Plan Act,4 was passed in California in 1976. This Act and its subsequent
regulations, similarly required stringent enforcement of quality, as well as
administrative and financial controls, and was purposefully aimed at
preventing the problems that had plagued the Medi-Cal HMOs.
Moreover, both federal and state laws, in recollection of the "non-profif'
scams, chose to permit the development of for-profit entities.
As a result of these incentives, many new HMOs sought state
licensure and federal qualification in the late 1970s and 1980s and most
were determined to be profit-making businesses 5 Conversion from
nonprofit entity to for-profit entity was extremely common in the mid1980s, as was consolidation, mergers and buy-outs. Large HMOs were
even listed on the national stock exchange. The "bottom line" became allimportant to the HMO, but the hope and expectation was that the strict
federal and state laws (and continuing oversight) would mitigate the
abuses associated with the money-hungry, cashpoor, under serving HMOs
of the past
Although the majority of providers were still resistant, in California
the providers soon came to the realization that it was fruitless to fight.
Large hospital-based' Individual Practice Associations" (IPAs) consisting
of numerous physicians with a wide range of specialties were formed in
order to contract with various HMOs in their areas. Some providers (as
well as directors, consultants and attorneys) became very wealthy upon
conversion to for-profit status by allocating stock to key players. (I know
at least one twenty-eight-year-old MBA who retired to a life at sea upon
conversion of his HMO). Today, there are HMO executives who are
actually reap near-billion dollar packages and multi-million dollar annual
.salaries after HMO conversions and buy outs.6

4 CAL.HEALTR&SA=ETYCODE, §

1340 (West 1996).
See Joanne Stem, The Conversion ofHealthMaintenance OrganiatinsfonnAaNonprofit to
For-ProfitStatus: Background MethodologiesandProblems,26 ST. LOUISU. L. J.711 (1982);
Theresa McMahon, Fair Value? The Conversion of Nonprofit -MfOs,30 U.S.F.L. REV. 355
(1996).
6A $920 million buy-out pertaining to just one HMO executive discussion. See WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 2, 1996. See also AMICANMIEDICALNEWS, Feb. 5, 1996, at3 (reviewing lMO executive
5

salaries).
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Once HMOs became large corporate entities, many prestigious law
firms clamored to represent them. Consequently, much of th, legal work
in the 1980s consisted of HMOs interacting and negotiating with
regulatory agencies in order to become licensed and qualified to expand
their enrollee base and to extend their service areas and/or to convert to
for-profit status. In the nineties, mergers, acquisitions, and buy-outs have
dominated the financial and legal scene as multi-million dollar companies
have come to dominate the managed care market.
IV.
In the mid-1970s, I served as a Consultant to the Department of Health
and Human Services in formulating contracts, doing site visits, and
reviewing feasibility and planning proposals pursuant to the IHMO Act of
1973. In 1977, 1 served as a Special Consultant to a California agency
called the Department of Corporations (Department), which was
responsible for licensing, regulating and overseeing HMOs after the 1976
Knox-Keene state law was enacted.
The Department was a very strange agency to entrust with the
regulation of HMOs since it was primarily involved with securities
regulation and had little, if any, expertise in the health care area.
However, it was widely believed that this particular agency had a
generally good reputation and would not allow the Medi-Cal abuse
problems which had developed under the Department of Health Services
to occur. The Department of Insurance, of course, was inadecuate to take
on the role of a regulatory agency since it was widely viewed as "a
revolving door to the industry." In any case, by 1978 1 decided to
become a full-time professor of health law at an emerging Southern
California law school (Whittier) and believed my active involvement in
the HMO industry was at its end. At that time, HMOs wereju-t beginning
to build a niche and it appeared they would remain a gradually developing
alternative to traditional medicine.

I Unfortunately, despite the confidence of the legislature, after twenty years of health care
regulation, the Department of Corporations is becoming much the same revolving door as the
Department of Insurance.
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Contrary to my predictions, nothing could have been further from the
truth. Few attorneys were familiar with HMO laws and regulations or
with the "underground rules" which governed licensure and conversion.
As the industry expanded and new federal and state laws were
implemented, I consulted with numerous law firms on these matters. I
cooperated and sometimes battled with the state and federal agencies
whose approvals were necessary, and testified before state legislatures
when hearings on new HMO laws were being considered. I wrote law
review articles based largely on my HMO experiences and the potential
problems that could develop when a health care system played the role of
both insurer and provider. The complication that could develop ranged
from meeting the duties, responsibilities and liabilities of HMO
management, to the emerging areas of tort law that could be utilized to
deter HtMO abuse.'
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, IMOs had gained a very solid
foothold in the U.S. health care system. Both Medicaid and Medicare
allowed, and even encouraged, beneficiaries to enroll and most employers
were mandated to offer the choice of an HMO to their employees who
joined in increasing numbers. The cost of HMO coverage was
considerably less than that of traditional insurance plans and the providers
were generally well-qualified, though often disgruntled by the constraints
imposed upon them. Few providers could get by financially without
aligning themselves at least to some extent with HMOs. In California, for
example, the vast majority of the insured population is currently enrolled
in a managed care plan. Moreover, it is projected that within three years,
approximately 60 percent of the national population will be similarly
enrolled.'
It soon became clear, however, that excellent providers did not
necessarily translate to excellent (or even adequate) care. The byword of
the system and the way to make money for stockholders was "managed
care," a system that required certain protocols including:
I

See Joanne Stern, PotentialLiabilityofthe Board ofDirectors of aHealth Maintenance
Organization,3 WhiTrERL.REV.1 (1981); Joanne Stem, BadFaihSuits:Are 7heyApplicable
To HealthMaintedanceOrganizations?, 85 W.V.L.REV. 911 (1983); Joanne Ster, Malpractc
in the ManagedCareIndustry, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 4 (1991).
9
See J.P. Werner, Forecastingthe Effects of Health Reform on U.S. Phsician Wriforce

Requirement: Evidence From Mf Staffing Patterns,272 JAMA 222,230 (1994).
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(1) restricting primary physicians from referring HMO patients to
specialists;
(2) requiring prior approval before allowing referrals of patients to
hospitals; and
(3) closely monitoring hospital stays.
Many physicians felt hamstrung by these limitations, but since most
liMOs were given bonuses and incentives to "come within or below
budget," providers' overall income was in many ways significantly
affected by their health care decisions. Basically, the more referrals they
made, the less money they earned.
Some physicians also felt the fiduciary relationship between
physician and patient had become severely compromised since decisions
about each enrollee's health, as well as accessibility and availability of
care, were strictly monitored by administrative personnel. Unfortunately,
health "maintenance" in many HMOs meant the patient was given short
shrift-- the least amount of services for the dollar. Because HMOs were
run as a business, financial performance was paramount. Consequently,
the question of how to cut down on spiraling costs while maintaining
integrity in the system and insuring adequate patient care was of foremost
concern to all parties.
V.
Thus, the era of litigation ensued. Failure to refer a patient to a specialist
in some cases led to premature death. Limitations on hospital stays
frequently resulted in dire consequences to the patient. Denial of benefits
for expensive new procedures for potentially terminal patients also had
ominous consequences. Although HMOs were not technically practicing
medicine, a variety of causes of action were brought against them based
on such legal theories as respondeatsuperior,ostensible agency, bad faith
breach of contract, corporate negligence, tortious interference with the
physician-patient relationship, and fraud and misrepresentalion.10

10For an excellent summary of such theories, see Diana J. Bearden & Bryan 1. Meadgen,
Emerging Theories ofLiabiliy in the ManagedCareIndustry, 47 BAYLORL. IEv. 281 (1995).
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"Risk-management" also became a key word in most MO
organizations as executives pondered how the HMO could control the
amount and extent of care afforded in given cases and simultaneously
limit the risk of adverse consequences leading to increased morbidity and
mortality rates. In addition, the IMO had to accomplish these goals while
avoiding adverse public publicity and perceptions, greater governmental
scrutiny, and explosive monetary awards. If compromise by the HMO
was necessary, it was always a one-sided compromise, with little, if any,
input from physicians and consumers. Although federally qualified
HMOs were required to have a certain number of consumers on their
boards, this requirement was easily met by choosing individuals they
preferred and giving them enrollment cards, thus making them instant
consumer "representatives."
Why then did we hear so little about these HMO abuses? Why have
so many HMOs escaped multi-million dollar verdicts even when their
alleged failures have been so well documented, and sometimes proven?
The paramount reason stems from the mandatory binding arbitration
clauses included in most HMO contracts which prevents most patients
who join HMOs from having access to the court system. Arbitration
proceedings are typically held in private forums. The rationales for their
findings are never spelled out and appeals are severely limited. In most
states, the legality of binding arbitration has been upheld, even if the
individual is totally unaware of his or her relinquishment of judicial
rights.11 As a result, confidentiality and lack of precedent in these IMO
decisions has not allowed for public outcry. Unethical practices,
violations of federal and state laws, and blatant abuses, if not condoned,
were at least not publicized. Moreover, arbitrators have been kmowa to
award significantly less per case than juries, and punitive damages are not
always available.
Even when court proceedings have been allowed, awards generally
have been minimal. This is largely because the U.S. Supreme Court in the
1987 Dedeaux v. PilotLife Ins. Co. decision,"2 determined that federal

"Madden v. Kaiser, 552 P. 2d 1178 (Cal. 1976).
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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employee retirement income security act (ERISA) laws' 3 overrode
virtually all state law causes of action relating to insurance and HMOs.
The vast majority of enrollees are covered by ERISA, a comprehensive
law created for the main purpose of protecting employees' rights and
benefits. HMOs can, therefore, request that virtually any alleged tort
violation that may get to court be transferred to federal court, where extracontractual tort damages, such as emotional distress and punitive damages
are not permitted under ERISA. It has always been my belief that
Congress never meant to restrict long-standing state tort actions against
insurers and liMOs in cases such as these, but the Supreme Court's ruling
(as interpreted by various lower courts) now governs such su.ts and since
ERISA prevails, extra-contractual and punitive damages cannot be
generally recovered.
Nevertheless, horror stories have abounded and have led both
providers and patients rights advocates to press for reform and redress. In
the last few years, two major IMOs have been sued for a "denial of
services" in state courts because ERISA law is not applicable in such
cases. In those cases, jury verdicts of $45 million and $89 raillion were
14
rendered against the iMOs.
In recognition ofthese abuses, various consumer protection prop osals
are now under consideration to eliminate the so-called "gag rules" in

provider--IMO contracts, which severely limit what the physician can
discuss with the HMO patient with regard to his or her treatment
options. 5 Pressure has also been placed on state agenc!Ies to more
severely penalize the offenses that regularly occur in some FIMOs.
These acts alone are not viable solutions to "rein in" the HMO
abuses. Because HMO economic systems thrive on limiting resources and
costs, not on preventing illness or maintaining health, they have
tremendous incentives to enroll healthy people but, less incentive to care

11 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §1001-1461 (1988 and Supp. V 1993)).
14 Adams v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of GeorgiaNo. 93-V5-7985 E (Feb. 2, 1995); Fox
v. Health Net, No. 21962 (Sup. Ct. of Riverside Cty., CA).
I Unfortunately, since this article was written, California's attempt to regulate HIMOs through
the proposition process in the recent national election was soundly defeated. Enormous amounts
of money spent by HMOs and insurance companies was successful in adversely influencing public
opinion.
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for them when they become ill. Furthermore, the HMO executives, who
are only answerable to stockholders, receive huge salaries and bonuses to
ensure profitability by continuing to do exactly what they have been
doing. Conversely, state and federal reform is slow and even where
physicians line up with the consumers, the major funding available for
political and public relations purposes itself derives from "deep pockef
HMOs.
The managed care business is now consolidating, and mergers and
buy-outs occur frequently. Even traditional insurance companies have
become active participants, and billion-dollar corporations have lead the
movement. In recent months, there have also been well-founded
allegations of organized-crime involvement in the IMO industry.' 6 If this
is true, capitalistic greed could be overshadowed by outright corruption.
In either case, consumers and physicians are the losers.
VI.
I have been an expert witness in many HMO arbitration proceedings.
Although these decisions are generally rendered in a much shorter period
than judicial decisions, they receive no publicity and set no precedent.
Moreover, the plaintiffs ability to "put on his case" may be thoroughly
eclipsed by the formidable experts, high-profile attorneys, and much larger
resources of the HMO. And, of course, ifthe HMO sees the"handwriting
on the wall," even arbitration proceedings may not proceed to final
judgment.
Perhaps a good example is one HMO arbitration in which I was
involved. In this instance, the HMO in question had limited the medical
coverage available to newborn infants to sixty days, despite the fact that
state law specifically prohibited such a limitation. The parents of the
infant involved in the case were school teachers forced to file for
bankruptcy and suffer two years of extreme emotional turmoil in order to
ensure that their infant, who eventually died, received the best care
possible. The parents eventually sought help from an attorney who
initiated a case against the EMO to recover both financial and emotional
IsDouglas McLeod, New JerseyProbingHeath Plan'sMob Res,Bus mSlSURANCE,pg.
1 (Aug. 26, 1996).
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damages. During discovery proceedings, the attorney found out from
former disgruntled employees, that the HMO president had been actively
involved in the decision-making process regarding this particular infant
and had actually overridden the medical director's initial decision to
provide full coverage. To avoid publicity and notoriety, the HMO settled
the case for a large amount of money contingent upon the plaintiffs'
execution of a confidentiality agreement prohibiting disclosure of both the
facts of the case and its ultimate outcome.
In another case in which I was involved, an HMO so closely
monitored its hospitalized members on a day-to-day basis -that almost
every physician felt pressured to release patients as soon as possible, even
if it was against their betterjudgment. In this case, a young man had been
admitted to the hospital with terrible abdominal pains. The physician in
charge initially thought it could be a urinary tract infection, but was
uncertain because the tests had not yet been completed. Because the
hospital HMO nurse insisted the patient had already been hospitalized for
as long as necessary, given the tentative diagnosis, the young man was
sent home with antibiotics and pain killers only to drop dead that same
night from a burst appendix.
Once the physician's insurance company had settled with the
decedent's family, the physician was only too happy to testify quite
angrily about the effects of the HMO's pressure on his decision in that
case, as well as others. "If they're in this HMO," he stated bitterly, "the
need for expedited, unwise release is always on my mind." By admitting
this, the HMO physician was virtually guaranteeing his expulsion from
any further HMO involvement As a foreign medical physician, he at least
had the opportunity to return to his country of origin.
An even more frightening scenario occurred several years ago in
California, in a case that received wide attention when two physicians
were actually charged with second degree murder for prematurely "pulling
the plug" of a patient on a respirator.'" However, not enough attention was
given to the physicians' reasons for doing so.' 8 Although there were
allegations of poor medical judgment and malpractice cover-up, some
' 7 Barber v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006 (1983).

I For an excellent review of this case, see Jonathan Kirsch, A Death at Kaiser Hospital,
CALiFORNmA MAGAZInE Nov. 1982, at 79.
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HMO critics believe the real reason for the premature euthanasia, even
when the patient still showed neurological hope, was to "free up" an
expensive hospital bed. It is impossible to dismiss these medical
implications of a system which thrives on minimizng medical bills.
It seems to me that it is absolutely necessary to allow regular judicial
review of HMO abuse cases in order to reform and balance the legal
system. Large damage awards and the concomitant publicity just might
embarrass the industry to reform itself as it has in many product liability
cases. Furthermore, when an HMO's income is totally dependent on
attracting subscribers, its ability to survive would be significantly
diminished ff major abuses and judicial decisions were well-publicized.
Strict fiscal control over entitlement programs, and more effective federal
and state regulation would also help. However, political and economic
realities and the increasingly close relationships between HMO advocates
and HMO regulators stand in the way of major legislative reform,
especially in an era of budget-balancing restraint, and deregulation.
Finally, the Pilot Life decision should be reconsidered, if not by the
Supreme Court then at least by Congress. Otherwise, it is likely that
managed care will come only to mean "restricted care," and other than
investors, HMOs will be answerable to no one.
While socialized medicine has been considered an anathema by
various provider groups, insurance companies and other profit-oriented
entities, unless managed care is managed well and with a fiduciary duty
to the patient, it poses an even greater threat to the health care system in
this country. If some significant changes are not made soon, we may all
simply become part of a huge bureaucracy where the actual care provided
is much less important than the capitalistic goals of the entities
themselves.

